



The
British State's
Drug Attack
Against
Afrikan
People

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The Pan-Afrikan People's Phone-in is a space for themed interactive discussions conducted over the airwaves and cyberspace. The themes are focused around issues affecting Afrikan people both locally and globally.

The Pan-Afrikan People's Phone-in regularly features guests from revolutionary Pan-Afrikanist organisations. From time to time others including non-Afrikan guests will be invited to contribute. The activities of all guests will be examined on the basis of their relevance to Afrikan people locally and worldwide. Interviews and presentations with guests will set the scene for the more general discussion (in the second half of the programme) where listeners will be invited to phone in, ask questions and contribute.

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The British state's drug attack against Afrikan people

1 Drug managers and Afrikan targets

1.1 Controlling interests in the worldwide illegal drugs industry

Capitalism has deliberately shrouded the mechanisms it uses for managing the worldwide illegal drug industry in a veil of mystery. The purpose of this approach is to keep the masses of the people of the world in a state of ignorance about how the industry really operates. This tactic gives protection to the evil criminals that control and profit from the illegal drugs industry. The following analysis sheds some light on how this evil industry operates:

Chatham House



"Now we will take the reader up through the chain of command of the world drug and dirty money business, to the top level of political control: to Chatham House, St James Square, London the headquarters of the Royal Institute of International Affairs ... It is obvious, by now, that an operation of this scope could not exist without the political approval of the British Government ... nor without the gigantic supporting facilities of the world's offshore credit markets, the world's gold and diamonds trade, and hands on management of the retail distribution, or organised crime aspect of the operation ... The Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA) and its leading personnel control not only the Far Eastern drug traffic but every important dirty money operation on the surface of the globe ... The next section will further document the British monarchy's control of the Canadian banks and corporations, the same installations responsible for channelling drugs into and illegal funds out of the United States." (Executive Intelligence Review, 1992, p. 235-236)

1.2 The inter-dependency of illegal drugs and 'legal' bankers

The illegal drugs business and its associated evils are essential components of the modern capitalist system. In some respects, illegal drugs and the money that it makes are the lifeblood of the capitalist system through their role in keeping capitalism's banking sub-system flourishing. As one capitalist has explained:

"... drugs have a two-fold purpose; first to bring in colossal sums of money and second, to eventually turn a major part of the population into mindless drug zombies who will be easier to control than people who don't need drugs." (Coleman, 1997, p. 125).

Illegal drugs therefore perform the most essential task of capitalism i.e. making money. It also has the secondary role of ensuring that the property of the capitalists is protected from the groups of people that they exploit and oppress. Furthermore, international finance capitalists need the illegal drug trade in order to survive; conversely, the illegal drug traders need the international finance capitalists for them to survive. These two sets of criminals have a symbiotic dependency on each other which is nurtured and nourished behind closed doors. They conceal their activities through a system of money laundering via off-shore banking arrangements. The book *Dope Incorporated* offers an insight into this sleaze filled financial world:

"The world financial system is now addicted to drug monies as a junkie is to heroin. Without the regular flow of these monies the system would collapse. As the London *Economist* wrote proudly in June 1989: 'It is obvious ... that drug dealers use banks ... The business ... has become part of the financial system ... If you had morals or ethics in this business, you would not be in it.'

U.S. finances are so dominated by money-laundering that Treasury officials cannot locate 80% of all the dollar bills printed by the U.S. Treasury. Cocaine plays such a predominant role in the U.S financial system that a significant majority of all \$20 bills show physical traces of cocaine dust on them ... To this day, money-laundering is not even a criminal offence in 8 out of the 15 industrialised nations. In the United States ... No top management has ever been charged or prosecuted for criminal money laundering activity.

The banks didn't just take advantage of the drug trade profits; they have promoted their right to make use of them. As one banker stated in an off the record discussion in London in 1986: Dope 'is the biggest source of the new financial business in the world today ... I know banks which will literally kill to secure a chunk of this action'.

The banker worked for one of Wall Street's biggest investment houses, Merrill Lynch. The chief executive officer of Merrill Lynch for 12 years was Donald Regan, who served as treasury secretary

and chief of staff of the White House for seven years of the Reagan presidency." (Executive Intelligence review, 1992, p. 41)

The inter-dependency between the bankers and the illegal drug merchants is now so great, that the Bankers have even become bold enough to call for their major money making drug venture to be turned into a legal business:

"The bankers have also sponsored the campaign to legalise drugs. 'Cocaine is indeed clearly the most profitable article of trade in the world', *The Economist* wrote in August 1989. 'Vast untaxed profits amass in the conspirators' hands. The time has come to legalise the drugs trade, the magazine argued.'" (Executive Intelligence Review, 1992, p. 41)

1.3 Flooding the Afrikan community with hard drugs

In the 1970's, the Afrikan community in Britain was officially categorised as a low crime community (Gilroy, 1987, p. 92). Despite the British state's attempts to criminalise the Afrikan community through the corrupt 'sus law' and false allegations of 'mugging', the police were not able to pin any major or organised crime label on Afrikan people. Furthermore, it is still widely acknowledged that throughout the late 1980's and early 1990's there was no hard drug problem in the Afrikan community.

Since there was no hard drug crime in the Afrikan community, the British state decided to put it there. It systematically flooded the Afrikan community with guns and drugs, using specially imported Afrikan mercenary gunmen as its agents. These mercenary gunmen had the dual role of surrogates, who would pass the full blame for flooding the Afrikan community with drugs on to the Afrikan community itself, whilst the real culprits hid behind the scenes. In this sense, they provided a cover story to help disguise the identities of the real criminals i.e. the 'masterminds' responsible for bringing in the guns and drugs.

As double cover against being detected, the real criminal 'masterminds' used their control of the media to project the false impression that they were opposed to the penetration of hard drugs into the Afrikan community. The criminal 'masterminds' tactic was to announce what they falsely and misleadingly described as an international 'anti-drug conference'. The conference would be opened by their queen; it would be hosted by the creature Margaret Thatcher, their then Prime Minister; the UN general secretary was to be a guest of honour; with the president of Columbia (the world's number one cocaine producing nation) as another 'honoured' guest.

The event was scheduled to be held at the £35,000 per day Queen Elizabeth Conference centre in central London in April 1990. This was an interesting choice of venue in that it is just 2 minutes walk away from the headquarters of the Royal Institute for International Affairs

(RIIA), the organisation we are told runs the worldwide illegal drug business. People in the industry of caring for the victims of drugs saw the façade immediately; drug treatment workers called it 'the great hype'. (Davison, 1997, p. 48).

However, there was really a hidden agenda behind the idea of this conference. The real intention was to bring together the characters we are informed are among the leading figures in the worldwide illegal drugs industry. They were to meet in close proximity to the headquarters of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, who apparently run the worldwide illegal drugs industry. This was to happen in close proximity to the innocent unsuspecting Afrikan people who were the intended target of their malicious anti-human drug smuggling campaign. In retrospect, this conference seems to have been intended as a platform to snidely launch their criminal plot to flood the Afrikan community in Britain with illegal guns and drugs.

Regardless of the real intention behind the conference, the 1990's saw disturbing increases in the availability of hard drugs in the Afrikan community. This increase was clearly the result of a calculated process designed as an outright attack against the Afrikan community. One team of researchers have offered an explanation illustrating how the illegal drugs industry developed and continues to operate on the streets of Britain. They inform us that:

"The drug business can be likened to a privatised railway system in that the dominant syndicates or individuals control key parts of the track and therefore their own distribution network for the drugs they import. Alternatively, smaller criminals may come to them to rent out a part of the truck for distributing drugs imported by others. Drug syndicates in different parts of the country also form temporary alliances to distribute one enormous importation, sometimes of several tons. Often, a powerful syndicate will pay a 'tribute' to another for moving drugs through its turf. Similarly, individual operators will pay a 'tax' to the local dominant crime syndicate after carrying out 'a bit of work' on their patch.

This is not to say the transformation of the British crime scene was without its turf wars. Crime syndicates battled for ascendancy in all four corners of the capital in the early nineties. The vast profits and greater opportunities to rip off 'associates' was another cause of an increase in violence. Also, the greater ease with which the police could insert undercover officers at most points along the drug distribution chain or run informants inside syndicates created a climate of suspicion. This quickly turned to paranoid violence, especially if criminals were getting high on their own supply.

There were said to be 43 murders in south-east London by the end of 1991, a 100 percent rise on the previous year ..." (Gillard, 2004, p. 128-129)

All of this systematic plotting and the associated activity, on the part of drug barons, resulted in an explosion of drug misuse in Britain. The illegal drug problem has now reached such proportions that one industry 'observer' has pointed out that:

"... there are an estimated 332,000 problem drug users in the UK – almost one in 10 of 15- to 64-year-olds ... the UK cocaine market is expanding ... the UK drug trade ... is worth some £8bn a year ... there was no doubt the market, particularly for cocaine powder is growing ... The Chief Constable of Cleveland, Sean Price, recently said that crack cocaine was now at its highest ever level." (Raynes, 2007, p. 16/7)

It is important to note that 'crack' cocaine is the drug that has been specifically targeted at Afrikan communities around the world. Furthermore, even though a substantial proportion of these drugs and the extreme violence associated with them have been targeted specifically at the Afrikan community in Britain, Afrikan people have never had anything more than a very marginal involvement in the profit making associated with the evil and illegal drugs industry.

2 Police criminality: A case study in drug recycling

2.1 Police attack: Afrikan people fight back – and win

Great son of Afrika Malcolm X gave a stark warning about the police force's management role in injecting organised crime into the Afrikan community. He cautioned:

"Any time there is a police commissioner who finds it necessary to increase the strength numerically of the police [in our community] ... and at the same time we don't see any sign of a decrease in crime ... we're justified in suspecting his motives ... The more cops we have, the more crime we have. We begin to think that they bring some of the crime with them." (Breitman, 2003, p. 72)

He also warned about the magnitude of the struggle that Afrikan people face when they set about clearing their communities' of the illegal hard drugs and other criminal 'enterprises' put there by the police and its masters. Again he cautioned:

"When you unite ... to fight organised crime, you'll find your selves fighting the police department itself because they are involved in the organised crime. Wherever you have organised crime, that type of crime cannot exist other than with the consent of the police, the knowledge of the police and the co-operation of the police.

You'll agree that you can't run a number in your neighbourhood without the police knowing it. A prostitute can't run a trick on the block without the police knowing it. A man can't push drugs anywhere on the avenue without the police knowing it. And they pay the police off so that they will

not get arrested. I know what I'm talking about – I used to be out there. And I know you can't hustle out there without police setting you up. You have to pay them off." (Breitman, 2003, p. 73)

One community of Afrikan people rose to the challenge of clearing their community of police criminality, police brutality and police sponsored organised crime, including the police's recycling of confiscated hard drugs back into the community. They took on the criminal London Metropolitan Police Force and won. As a result of the heroic struggle of the Afrikan community and its allies in Stoke Newington, East London, small pieces of information about the criminal drug pushing role of the Metropolitan police force have been, at least, partially exposed.

2.2 Drug recycling in between murders: Stoke Newington police station

There can be no doubt the police are actively involved in the recycling of hard drugs into the Afrikan community. Amongst the plethora of other reasons for our certainty, we can assert this because they have actually admitted it. For instance, a senior metropolitan police officer Roy Clark was commissioned to write a top secret report on drug recycling to the then commissioner of the metropolitan police, John Stevens:

"The report went onto say that police officers were involved in recycling drugs ... [and] ... there was a 'wilful blindness' among police managers and supervisors." (McLagan, 2005, p. 27)

Colin Roach Protest



Roy Clark should know, because he was the head of the notorious Stoke Newington police station where this criminal activity was systematically practiced. Stoke Newington police station has the unenviable record of repeatedly murdering Afrikan people in custody. Victims include: Aseta Simms, James Sullivan, James Hall, Robert Pratt, Wilma Lucas, Matthew Paul,

Oliver Clairemonte, Colin Roach, Michael Farriera (Roach Family Support Campaign, 1988, p. 241 & 243) and Shiji Lapite (Gillard, 2004, p. 186; Sivanandan, 1991, p. 18 & 47).

In between murdering Afrikan people this station doubled as one of Scotland Yard's cells for distributing drugs throughout the local innocent unsuspecting Afrikan community. The conduct of officers at Stoke Newington police station was so bad that the local MP Brian Sedgemore raised an early day motion in Parliament condemning:

"... those nasty, vile and corrupt police officers at Stoke Newington Police station who have been engaged in drug trafficking and perverting the course of justice ..." (McLagan, 2005, p. 24)

One of the many examples of drug recycling at Stoke Newington police station involved the setting up of a 'crack house' to attack the local innocent unsuspecting Afrikan community. This particular anti-Afrikan 'crack house' attack started when an Afrikan woman Pearl Cameron was arrested by Detective Constable Roy Lewandowski for possession of cocaine. He used the arrest as an opportunity to try out General Frank Kitson's technique and 'turned' her into a secret agent operating on behalf of the police. She became one of the police tools used to attack the innocent unsuspecting Afrikan community.

"Lewandowski had persuaded her to sell crack for him, with him providing some protection ... [for which] ... She had often paid the officer £1,000 a week and one occasion nearly £2,000." (McLagan, 2005, p. 24).

He also provided her with drugs that were confiscated from either other dealers or junkies. She sold the drugs and paid him a substantial commission (Gillard, 2004, p. 171). At the same time as being a police sponsored, small time drug dealer, Pearl Cameron received another line of income for her work as a police informer. The arrangement was eventually upset by a vigorous community campaign against the corrupt practices of the police at Stoke Newington police station and Pearl Cameron was arrested.

In court, Pearl Cameron said that DC Lewandowski set up the raid on her house because she refused to continue dealing (Morton, 2002, p. 203). Although her evidence appears to have been accepted, it did not prevent her conviction; Pearl Cameron was jailed for 4 years in 1992 as a direct result of running a 'crack house' under the supervision of DC Lewandowski. The judge told her that 'the relatively light sentence was because her dealing stemmed from the advances of a corrupt police officer' (McLagan, 2005, p. 24).

However, despite his obvious operational management of the Stoke Newington based 'crack house', police officer Roy Lewandowski was not jailed for his 'drug recycling' activities. No explanation has been given for the failure to arrest, charge, try, convict and sentence him for

his *prima facie* part in the police sponsored criminal attack against the innocent unsuspecting Afrikan community.

The 'crack house' managed by 'those nasty, vile and corrupt police officers at Stoke Newington Police station', was not an isolated incident. Many witnesses and informers came forward with evidence that police officers at Stoke Newington were engaged in corrupt drug related activities (McLagan, 2005, p. 24). There was an ongoing pattern of police criminality. In fact:

"... 13 drug cases had to be overturned on grounds including that [police officers at Stoke Newington police station] had lied on oath and planted drugs ... [and a further] ... 77 cases had not been investigated ..." (Gillard, 2004, p. 185).

2.3 The bogus investigation into police drug recycling at Stoke Newington

The police officer in charge of the drug recycling, drug running, drug planting and drug distribution cell otherwise known as Stoke Newington police station was Chief Superintendent Roy Clark (McLagan, 2005, p. 24). We are told that Chief Superintendent Roy Clark 'knew that corruption ran deep' in his station. (McLagan, 2005, p. 25). Clark has gone on record confirming that the police force's unofficial corruption procedure was explained to him early in his career. He says that he was told by a 'respected officer':

"... that the inspector was the 'best in the world' and if he ever got 'a drink' [a monetary bribe from a criminal], he should give some to the inspector, who would always look after him. Apparently 'Clark knew what was being suggested, but remained silent'." (McLagan, 2005, p. 25)

Clark was fully conversant with how senior police officers in the metropolitan police were paid bribes by their juniors to protect the latter when they engaged in corrupt criminal practices. He would have known this at the point when community pressure forced him to admit that in:

"Stoke Newington ... he found that there was more than the odd rotten apple ... what had developed [in his own police station] was a cell or organised corruption." (McLagan, 2005, p. 25)

However, instead of jailing the 'rotten apples' and removing them from the police force, Clark set about covering his and his colleague's backs. Clark's cover up strategy was to suggest that the whole drug recycling operation had festered under Detective Sergeant Graham Le Blond, who had been moved on to Edmonton police station (Gillard, 2004, p. 172) - presumably to set up another police drug recycling cell. Instead of dismissing these criminals in uniform, he set about introducing a system of rewards for his police colleagues known to be directly involved in 'recycling drugs' into the innocent unsuspecting Afrikan community.

Two officers were rewarded with the form of paid holiday known as 'suspension'. One of them was DC Barry Lyons (Gillard, 2004, p. 185). The other graduated into the international smuggling side of the drugs trade:

"Years later one of those suspended, Ronald Palumbo, received a ten year prison sentence for smuggling cannabis and another officer was later charged separately with serious corruption."
(McLagan, 2005, p. 24)

One officer Gerry Carroll allegedly committed suicide by blowing a hole in his own head with a revolver in Barkingside police station custody unit on 29 January 1992 (Gillard, 2004, p. 70). He was named by several dealers as being involved in the drug deals organised within Stoke Newington police station (Morton, 2002, p. 203). His supposed suicide has many parallels with the case of Colin Roach, an Afrikan man whose head was blown off with a shot gun in the foyer of Stoke Newington police station at around midnight on 12th/13th January 1983 (Roach Family Support Campaign, 1988, p. 47).

John Grieve & Roy Clark



Eight officers were rewarded for their criminal attacks against the innocent unsuspecting Afrikan community in Stoke Newington with moves to other police stations: One of them DC Declan Costello went on to become a bodyguard to John Major the British prime minister (Gillard, 2004, p. 406). We were helped with the names of the remaining offenders when a total of 12 officers were named by Dianne Abbot MP in the House of Commons. She informed us that:

"A number of officers have been accused of planting drugs, theft, and conspiracy to pervert the course of justice ... PC Mark Carroll ... PC Terrence Chitty ... PC Bruce Galbraith ... DC Bernard

Gillan ... DC Paul Gascombe ... PC Christopher Hart ... DC Peter McCulloch ... [and] ... DS Robert Watton ..." (Gillard, 2004, p. 183-4).

From the outset, there was little likelihood of CDS Roy Clark's investigations coming to the conclusion that he or any of the other senior police officers at the station had masterminded the criminal 'drug recycling' racket. Nor was he likely to conclude that he and his senior colleagues were set up to supervise the drug recycling cell by officials higher up in Scotland Yard and the broader British state machinery. Instead, Roy Clark sought to limit his enquiries to the idea that the corrupt police drug dealings only involved 'constables and some sergeants'.

In the midst of all of the blatant evidence, not one single police officer was arrested, charged, tried, convicted, sentenced or jailed for their role in recycling drugs into the innocent unsuspecting Afrikan community. This outcome was hardly surprising when CDS Roy Clark was appointed to investigate the corrupt drug dealing practices in his own police station. It seems obvious that the purpose of Clark's investigation was to protect the drug cycling police officers. Could it be that they were paying him bribes to cover them?

In contrast, drug dealing police officers in other parts of London such as DC Bob Clark, DC Chris Drewry (McLagan, 2005, p. 271-3) and DC Eric Donaldson (McLagan, 2005, p. 399-400) were imprisoned for their drug cycling activities. Their recycling activities happened in areas with much lower concentrations of Afrikan people. The reason for their appropriate punishment may well have been because they supplied drugs to fellow Europeans instead of the police force's intended target – the innocent unsuspecting Afrikan community – as happened in Stoke Newington.

The public could be forgiven for expecting the resignation of any senior police officer responsible for managing a police station which doubled as a drug distribution den. When such a den is exposed, the officer in charge is left with no legitimate excuse; either he is corrupt and, through the police force's unofficial bribery system, is directly responsible for managing the 'drug cycling' operation at his station, or he is incompetent because he is unable to detect a police 'drug cycling' ring even when it was happening right under his nose. In short he is either a criminal or he is incompetent; regardless of which it is, he must go.

However, instead of being forced to resign, CDS Roy Clark (a prime candidate for police drug recycling supervisor) was actually rewarded. Scotland Yard was so pleased with Roy Clark's failure to convict any police officer for their part in 'drug recycling' at his own police station Stoke Newington, that they decided to promote him to work in SO11 'the Yard's intelligence branch, then headed by John Grieve'. (McLagan, 2005, p. 26). In January 1991 Grieve testified in a British court in defence of Roy Garner – who was sentenced to 22 years for his

involvement in a plot to smuggle a 392kg consignment of cocaine valued at £100m into Britain (Jennings, 1990, p. 3 & 180). At the time, this was the largest amount ever seized. Clark's promotion appears to have been his reward for covering up the systematic 'drug recycling' operation at Stoke Newington police station and his transparent failure to secure the conviction of himself or any of the 'drug recycling' colleagues under his command.

In 1992 he was rewarded with a busman's holidays to New York and Jamaica to 'make an assessment of the situation' created by the killer mercenaries that Scotland Yard had imported into Britain (Davison, 1997, p. 167). By the early 1990's Scotland Yard could no longer cover up the fact that their killer mercenaries had murdered, maimed and doped up Afrikan children in Britain. He recommended the sending over of more killer mercenaries - presumably to do more of the same and attempted to cover his tracks by recommending the introduction of visas against honest Jamaican citizens seeking legitimate entry to Britain (McLagan, 2006, p. 43).

On 1st April 2004, the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) came into being. Clark's cover ups appear to have impressed his seniors in Scotland Yard and higher state structures to such an extent that he was given the job of as its first head. The IPCC is an organisation which allegedly 'independently' investigates police corruption and other wrong doings. Its track record however, does not live up to its claim of 'independence'.

3 Hidden agendas behind drug trafficking

3.1 The drug smuggling cover stories

The London Metro newspaper reported that on 21st November 2007, two teenage girls were found guilty of trying to smuggle £300,000 worth of cocaine from Ghana to London.

"Yasemin Vatansever and Yatunde Diya were caught with 6kg (13lbs) of the drug in two laptop computer bags at [Ghana] airport in the capital Accra in July ... They were paid £3,000 each to carry the bags onto the flight to Britain by two men." (Campbell, 2007, p. 21).

In many ways, this is typical of the calibre of drug smuggling story presented to us by the British media. On this occasion, one of the girls was European. However, this type of story is usually presented as Afrikan women placing drugs in every available orifice as a means of evading detection. The tendency is for these articles to proceed to denigrate and vilify young Afrikan women carriers who are presented as being completely amoral. This kind of story is deliberately and misleadingly designed to cast the blame for drug smuggling onto Afrikan people, particularly Afrikan women.

Although some of these cases are undoubtedly factually correct, in the greater scheme of drug smuggling, they really represent a media charade. This kind of reporting forms part of a

cover story specifically designed to distract us from the real drug smuggling processes going on behind the scenes. This camouflage technique is used to fool us into thinking that something is being done to counter drug smuggling. It hides more than it reveals. For instance, the quantities of drugs involved are ridiculously small: Why risk going to prison for a 6kg suitcase of cocaine when, for essentially the same risk, a lorry load in excess of 6,000kg could be smuggled?

Furthermore, Ghana does not produce cocaine, which means that there must be other legs in the transportation process from South America to Britain. The cocaine is grown in Columbia, refined in Brazil, transported across Brazil, across the Atlantic, mostly to Portugal and Spain, but also to West Afrika, before being sent to London and other European destinations by the lorry load (Executive Intelligence Review, 1992, p. 44). Each leg in the journey involves teams of people, but the article fails to make any of these linkages. It fails to inform us about any other parts of the journey, the warehousing of the drugs, or any of the multitudes of other people involved. The biggest give away is that no-one, other than the carriers, is ever arrested. The masterminds have not even been named, let alone brought to justice. This type of news story must be assessed on the basis of the facts that it leaves out; it is nothing more than a deceptive front.

3.2 Uninsured drug smuggling operations

To have any understanding of the real processes involved in drug smuggling, we must find examples of high volume international drug transfers. Clearly, one of the things that the individual drug courier lacks is the capacity to transport large volumes of drugs. The serious smuggler will therefore make use of facilities such as private planes, private boats, lorries, ships, tankers, trains and other forms of transportation that have sufficient capacity to make the risk 'worthwhile'.

For instance, in February 1992, the luck of metropolitan police officer DC Ronald Palumbo ran out when he was caught driving a lorry from Spain to Britain loaded with cannabis. It was one of four lorry loads of drugs that he admitted to being involved in shipping into the country (McLagan, 2004, p. 196). Despite being a police officer, Ronald Palumbo was obviously not sufficiently well connected because his lack of protection caused him to receive a ten year prison sentence for drug smuggling. (McLagan, 2004, p. 24). However, getting caught with a large lorry load of drugs suggests that Palumbo at least understood that if you are going to risk going to prison for drug smuggling, then you might as well get caught with a massive quantity.

Similarly, in 1994 Joseph Kassar, a Manchester businessman was convicted of a plot to smuggle £67 million worth of cocaine into Britain. In addition, his capture led to the recovery by Customs of nearly £150 million pounds worth of cocaine at a warehouse in Stoke-on-Trent.

(Morton, 2002, p. 313). Kassar was believed, by customs, to be part of a larger drug running cartel with connections to the British police. This might help to explain why no-one else from this cartel was caught. Nonetheless, the fact that he was convicted is evidence that his drug cartel's insurance policy with the police was not sufficient to cover his magnitude of criminal activity.

It would appear that the serious drug smuggler needs to have the means to purchase massive quantities of drugs. This might help to explain why so many major drug dealers appear to be businessmen. They also need to have the capability to transport massive quantities of drugs across international borders. On top of these factors it is also essential that serious drug smugglers have grand warehousing facilities so that the drugs can be stored without raising suspicion. However, perhaps the most vital ingredient is police protection, which is essential for ensuring that the drugs can be shipped through to their destination without being intercepted. If any of these ingredients are missing from the drug smuggling operation, the consequences for the smugglers can be very high indeed.

3.3 Drug smuggling with police protection

In August 1986 Nicholas Chrastney, a police informer, smuggled what was then the largest quantity of cocaine ever known to have arrived in Britain. He brought in a consignment of 392 Kilos of cocaine which was valued at £100 million; the cargo was supplied to him by the Columbian Ochoa family, the leaders of the Medellin cocaine cartel. The cocaine was carefully concealed in a specially adapted private boat and smuggled across the Atlantic onto the English shore under cover of darkness. (Jennings, 1990, p. 123)

On 19th June 1987 Chrastney was arrested outside his flat in Baker Street. Two days later cocaine valued at £14 million was found in a flat close by in Harley Street. (Morton, 2002, p. 109). The Harley Street flat containing the £14 million worth of cocaine was, in fact, Chrastney's flat (Morton, 2002, p. 201). However, fortunately for Chrastney he had very close relations with the police force both personally and professionally. His wife was a former police woman and he was benefiting from the protection of Scotland Yard. The Yard's protection was fronted by senior police officer Tony Lundi. Chrastney did a deal with the police and was not convicted. In fact, Scotland Yard went out of its way to ensure that he never suffered a single day in jail (Jennings, 1990, p. 5).

On 9th June 1992, businessman Brian Charrington was caught white handed by Customs and the number 2 North East Regional Crime Squad with a plane load of cocaine when he landed his private aircraft at Teeside airport. Customs and the number 2 North East Regional Crime Squad were working jointly on preparing the case against him. Throughout the whole of the joint investigation, the number 2 North East Regional Crime Squad failed to inform customs that Brian Charrington was working for them apparently as 'an informer'. Instead:

"The moment he was arrested, the police went to his rescue. If need be, they would give evidence in his defence". (Morton, 2002, p. 313)

Charrington seems to have had friends in very high places, because on 28th January 1993 for reasons which have never been made public, the Crown Prosecution Service dropped all charges against him. He was then released to freely go about his 'business', with an 'unblemished record'. Meanwhile, from the late 1980's until the early 2000's, the British public were being bombarded with misleading cover stories alleging that so called 'Yardies' (they were really mercenaries on Scotland Yard's payroll) were bringing cocaine to Britain.

Whilst working under the supervision of Larry Hart, a senior police officer based at Scotland Yard, a businessman and police informer by the name of Michael Michael was:

"... supervising the UK distribution of massive amounts of cannabis and cocaine smuggled into the country by a variety of means ..." (McLagan, 2004, p. 390).

Those means included: drugs that were hidden inside drums which were hidden inside tanker lorries; secret compartments in tourist coaches; and also drugs that were concealed in ordinary cars. This arrangement was eventually broken up by Customs. When they raided Michael's industrial unit, customs found: 3 tonnes of cannabis resin, valued at £10 million and 13 Kilos of cocaine, valued at £1.8 million.

Michael (the co-ordinator of drug smuggling activities) said that he gave Hart (his police supervisor) up to £10,000 a week for his protection. In return, the police officer provided tip offs on police and customs investigations and turned a blind eye to his drug dealing activities. (McLagan, 2004, p. 390).

"Customs took the view that relations between [Hart – the police officer] and Michael [the drug distributor] were too close for it to be a normal informant-handling operation." (McLagan, 2004, p. 391)

Customs believed that Hart's real role had been to protect Michael or his drugs organisation. (McLagan, 2004, p. 392). It would appear that those drug smugglers that are serious about not getting caught can secure protection for their activities by paying sufficiently senior police officers to provide them with 'Yardie' cover stories and an exemption from prison.

A criminal alliance with the police force seems to operate a bit like a 'get out of jail card' in the game of Monopoly. When the smuggler gets caught, the police contact is used to ensure that the smuggler does not go to jail. Unfortunately for Michael, his £10,000 a week 'get out of jail

card' failed him. Some of the other examples above also illustrate that police protection is not 'fool proof' for the smuggler. Although, even when the smugglers operating with police protection are caught and punished, it is observable that their police supervisors never seem to make it into jail.

There is an obvious danger that at some point in the future, an enraged British public might demand the imprisonment of the corrupt police officers that take drug money and other bribes. The police and the British state have already made contingency arrangements to cover themselves from these types of 'error'. They have used the law to protect themselves from 'undue embarrassment'.

"Following an act of Parliament [Police Act, 1996; Chapter 16, Section 93(1)], the police have been permitted to 'accept gifts of money, and gifts or loans of other property, on such terms as appear to the authority to be appropriate.'" (Monbiot, 2000, p. 2).

The police no longer have to disturb themselves with creating stories to cover up their 'extra earnings'. It is now virtually impossible to make a legal issue out of police bribery because it appears to no longer be a crime. Since it is no longer a crime, there is no need for the media to highlight bribes as wrong doing. The corrupt British system can therefore 'secretly' carry on its corrupt wrongdoing without the threat of embarrassing exposures.

3.4 Battles between drug cartels

Capitalism's object in highlighting the types of seizures identified above is to throw us off the scent of what is really going on. The seizures supply the general public with examples of drug syndicates and individuals being caught and give the impression that 'we' are winning the 'war on drugs'. However, these publicity stunts are specifically designed not affect the main flow of drugs coming into the country. By using this technique, the real drug and gun movements remain camouflaged and the general public is kept in complete ignorance. This point is emphasised by John Colman in the following terms:

"Shipments of cocaine are sometimes interdicted and seized. This is mere window dressing. Often times, the shipments seized belong to a new organisation trying to break into the trade. Such competition is put out of business by informing the authorities exactly where it is going to entre the [country] and who the owners are. The big stuff is never touched ..." (Coleman, 1997, p. 108).

His views are supported by other investigators, who cite the US Satan drug interdiction policy aim of reducing drugs by 50% as a programme deliberately designed to misleads the public. They argue that in practice, this has meant the US Satan government working with one group of drug runners with the objective of controlling or eliminating another (Executive Intelligence Review, 1992, p. 41). Related to this is the fact that only insiders are able to confirm whether

or not the quantity of drugs that are officially intercepted is the same as the full total of the drugs that was originally shipped.

The methods vary but, there are many examples of British state officials being caught in the act of attempting to recycle 'seized' drugs (McLagan, 2005, p. 23-26). One method of recycling drugs is where one of the insiders giving the government the tip off secretly removes the majority of the drugs before they are 'seized'. Another method is for the officers involved in the 'seizure' to secretly help themselves to a proportion of the 'seized' drugs. Yet another method is for officers connected with the storage of drugs to help themselves to a supply. Criminals who have been caught smuggling are always willing to go along with a false story of smaller 'seizures' because the lower the quantity of drugs they are caught with, the lower their sentences.

Whatever customs and police officers claim to be doing to intercept illegal drugs, it is clear that despite the highly publicised drug interceptions, Afrikan communities continue to be flooded with an endless supply. This flooding of the Afrikan community in Britain is tangible evidence to support claims that state officials help themselves to the intercepted drugs and recycle them into the Afrikan community for their personal profit.

In terms of the current level of detection of illegal drugs being smuggled into the country, the situation has now deteriorated dramatically with the effect that greater volumes of drugs are now being dumped into the Afrikan community:

"Class A drug confiscations at ports and airports have tumbled in the last four years ... Less than 3 tons of cocaine was seized in 2006-7 compared with over 9 tons in 2004-5 ... smuggling drugs into Britain was [now] easier than at any time in the last 30 years ..." (Raynes, 2007, p. 16/7)

This deterioration in detection rates has happened despite the establishment of the British government's new anti-drug agency, the Serious Organised Crime Agency (Soca). Not only has this agency demonstrated a greater aptitude for failing to prevent the importation of illegal hard drugs, but this new agency:

"... frequently refuses to follow-up operations to catch the organisers behind customs 'cold find' frontier seizures." (Raynes, 2007, p. 16/7)

It is ironic that law enforcement agencies seem unable to detect and destroy the laboratories that are used to convert the raw materials into the types of drugs that are sold into Afrikan communities. They seem unable to detect and close down the routes through which massive amounts of drugs are systematically transported in order to be sold into Afrikan communities. They seem unable to detect the factories that produce the guns and other weapons that are

used on innocent unsuspecting Afrikan people; and they seem unable to detect the routes through which the guns and other weapons are systematically transported in order to get them into the hands of police agents in Afrikan communities. Surely this level of failure requires official sanction?

"Are we to believe that with all the modern and vastly improved surveillance techniques, including satellite recognition available to law enforcement agencies in these countries, that this vile trade cannot be pinpointed and stopped?" (Coleman, 1997, p. 107).

In fact it is impossible to believe that governments cannot do more to stop the trade in illegal drugs, when government sponsored drug smugglers such as Colonel Oliver North of the US Satan army and Director William Casey of the US Satan CIA are not, in any way, sanctioned for their criminal behaviour. These criminals were caught white handed smuggling illegal guns and illegal drugs across international borders on the orders of their government and were described as 'national heroes' for doing so.

3.5 Drug smuggling with impunity

The Rolls Royce of drug smuggling is a system that allows large shipments of drugs to pass through international borders officially and without any hindrance whatsoever. An operation at this level requires that the smugglers have national governments, including their police forces, under their control. John Coleman quotes a top secret report written by the group we are informed are the real controllers of the worldwide drugs market, the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Executive Intelligence Review, 1992, p. 235). He indicates that they are seeking:

"... full control of the drugs trade [which] must be completed in order that the governments of all countries who are under [their] jurisdiction will have a monopoly which [they] will control through supply ..." (Coleman, 1997, p. 126).

Furthermore, a top level drug smuggling operation requires the governments under its control to develop and agree international systems that secretly support the illegal international drugs trade. These systems can then be used to allow the free clandestine passage of drugs, guns and other illegal items, without any embarrassing seizures exposing their illegal operations to the general public. One such system exists in the European Union (EU); it is called the Triangle Internationale Routier (TIR) system.

Coleman argues that most small countries have a hand in the criminal smuggling 'enterprises' that make use of the TIR type of loophole. He is not alone in citing the Bulgarian Company, Kintex Trucks which he says operates with a whole fleet of trucks that smuggle drugs using this system. Furthermore, secret police and state-owned import-export agencies have been

found to be operating in a supervisory role, helping the drug shipments on their way (Executive Intelligence Review, 1992, p. 19). He explains that:

"Trucks bearing this [TIR] marker and the EU recognition number are not supposed to be stopped at customs boarder posts. TIR trucks are allowed to carry only perishable items. They are supposed to be inspected in the country in which they originate and documentation to this effect is carried by each truck driver.

Under international treaty obligations this is what happens, thus Kintex trucks were able to load cargoes of heroine and certify it as 'fresh fruits and vegetables', and then make their way through Western Europe ... The only way to stop huge amounts of heroine and cocaine presently finding their way to markets in Europe ... is to end the TIR system." (Coleman, 1997, p. 105).

Rather than end the TIR system, the British state has joined with other EU states in keeping the TIR system very secret. There are no newspaper articles exposing, or even questioning the dangers to the Afrikan community and the rest of the public in Britain that the TIR system brings. There are no government ministers or senior police officers complaining about the potential increase in organised crime and corresponding 'breakdown of law and order' that the TIR system brings. Instead, the dangers of the TIR system are completely ignored by the state and great noises are made about 'mules' smuggling tiny amounts of drugs through airports.

"Remember [the TIR system] next time you read in the newspapers that a big haul of heroine [or cocaine] was found in a false-bottom suit case at Kennedy airport, and some unlucky 'mule' pays the price for his criminal activity. This kind of action is only 'small potatoes', sand in the eyes of the public, to make us think our government is really doing something about the drug menace." (Coleman, 1997, p. 105/6).

4 Eliminating the illegal drug menace

4.1 Jail the drug bankers

Drug traffickers make literally billions of dollars. They make so much cash money that if they were to hold onto it, they would not be able to house it. Even if they could house it, there would be the problem of how to prevent others from stealing it. These massive cash surpluses put the international finance capitalists (i.e. the bankers) at the heart of the illegal drugs industry. The drug traffickers make so much cash money, that were it not for the illegal money laundering 'services' provided by the bankers, they would figuratively speaking drown in their cash. This means that any serious attempt to destroy the illegal drug menace must be primarily directed against the money laundering bankers. We are informed that in order:

"To actually destroy Dope, Inc. and eliminate the drug problem, it is not a matter of arguing whether consumption or production must be stopped first. The enemy must be hit simultaneously on all fronts – above all on the financial front. The money laundering aspect must be attacked with special vigour since this is Dope, Inc.'s jugular – and in war, one must always go for the enemy's jugular." (Executive intelligence Review, 1992, p. 42-43)

4.2 Mobilise the grassroots

Since governments are so heavily implicated in the illegal drugs industry, they cannot be relied upon to stop these clandestine financial activities. Some governments indirectly represent the interests of the groups that profit from the misery created by illegal drug use. Other governments go a step further, actively and to some extent openly participating in the illegal drug trade which they know brings such misery to the people they govern. There is also a tendency for some governments to actively protect the exploiting drug dealing capitalists who contribute so greatly to their people's suffering and corresponding misery. This tendency means that so long as capitalist governments remain dominant, there will be no end to the illegal drug menace. It also means that the ending of the market in illegal drugs will not happen until a worldwide revolution has taken a firm hold and capitalism's profit motive is subdued.

The struggle against the illegal drugs industry is ultimately a revolutionary one. An important first step in that process is educating people in the affected nations about the reality of how the evil drugs industry practically operates in readiness for change. They must learn about how the illegal drugs industry works in order to develop strategies for its destruction. Their learning will also assist the people in developing their understanding of the necessity of revolutionary change. This information will help the people to clarify the actions they need to take to eliminate the illegal drugs industry as the balance of world power changes in their favour.

To eliminate the worldwide illegal drugs industry, alliances will be needed between revolutionary grass roots organisations, in both consuming and producing nations. These anti-drug industry allies must be willing to carry out local campaigns against imperialist, neo-colonialist and other governments that support the illegal drugs trade. Part of their respective campaigns will involve pressuring 'their' governments to put in place anti-drug measures which 'their' governments secretly oppose. Each revolutionary grassroots organisation will be responsible for the prosecution of their part of the overall campaign. They will work within their own geographical region, but will each operate more efficiently through a system of shared information.

4.3 Blueprint for drug elimination

The specific measures to be taken are a development of the strategy outlined in the book *Dope Incorporated* (Executive Intelligence Review, 1992, p. 43-44). They have the dual purpose of preparing the people to fight the drug industry menace and simultaneously preparing them for revolutionary change. An outline campaign to eliminate the illegal drugs industry might look something like this:

- 1) *Stop drug-money laundering*
 - Banking transparency
 - Seize the drug traffickers' assets
 - Jail the drug bankers

- 2) *Stop drug production*
 - Satellite detection of all production and processing sites
 - Air and land military assault on crops and laboratories
 - Seize all illegal shipments of chemicals used for processing drugs

- 3) *Stop drug distribution*
 - AWACS and other radar technology detection of shipments
 - X-ray and nuclear magnetic resonance technologies to 'search' all shipments
 - End the TIR truck transportation system

- 4) *Stop drug consumption*
 - Stop the drug legalisation campaign
 - Severe jail terms for all traffickers and dealers
 - Develop treatment processes to help addicts recover

- 5) *Anti-drug education campaign*
 - Total exposure of the institutions and key individuals involved in perpetuating the illegal drugs industry
 - Jail owners and leaders of organisations and institutions that promote the social use of drugs (i.e. offending night clubs)
 - Promote culturally specific education programmes among youth
 - Cascade the education programme through schools, media, music, video games etc.

- 6) *Develop worldwide alliances between revolutionary grassroots organisations*
 - Build local anti-drug movements
 - Support frontline Afrikan and other revolutionary movements

- Develop links and share information with Afrikan and non-Afrikan revolutionary movements

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